DigitalAssetTransactions:WhenHoweyMetGary(Plastic)RemarksattheYahooFinanceAllMarketsSummit:CryptoThankyouAndy.Iampleasedtobeheretoday.Thiseventprovidesagreatopportunitytoaddressatopicthatisthesubjectofconsiderabledebateinthepressandinthecrypto-community–whetheradigitalassetofferedasasecuritycan,overtime,becomesomethingotherthanasecurity.Tostart,weshouldframethequestiondifferentlyandfocusnotonthedigitalassetitself,butonthecircumstancessurroundingthedigitalassetandthemannerinwhichitissold.Tothatend,abetterlineofinquiryis:“Canadigitalassetthatwasoriginallyofferedinasecuritiesofferingeverbelatersoldinamannerthatdoesnotconstituteanofferingofasecurity?”Incaseswherethedigitalassetrepresentsasetofrightsthatgivestheholderafinancialinterestinanenterprise,theanswerislikely“no.”Inthesecases,callingthetransactionaninitialcoinoffering,or“ICO,”orasaleofa“token,”willnottakeitoutofthepurviewoftheU.S.securitieslaws.Butwhataboutcaseswherethereisnolongeranycentralenterprisebeinginvestedinorwherethedigitalassetissoldonlytobeusedtopurchaseagoodorserviceavailablethroughthenetworkonwhichitwascreated?Ibelieveinthesecasestheanswerisaqualified“yes.”Iwouldliketosharemythinkingwithyoutodayaboutthecircumstancesunderwhichthatcouldoccur.BeforeIturntothesecuritieslawanalysis,letmesharewhatIbelievemaybemostexcitingaboutdistributedledgertechnology–thatis,thepotentialtoshareinformation,transfervalue,andrecordtransactionsinadecentralizeddigitalenvironment.Potentialapplicationsincludesupplychainmanagement,intellectualpropertyrightslicensing,stockownershiptransfersandcountlessothers.Thereisrealvalueincreatingapplicationsthatcanbeaccessedandexecutedelectronicallywithapublic,immutablerecordandwithouttheneedforatrustedthirdpartytoverifytransactions.Somepeoplebelievethatthistechnologywilltransforme-commerceasweknowit.Thereisexcitementandagreatdealofspeculativeinterestaroundthisnewtechnology.Unfortunately,therealsoarecasesoffraud.Inmanyregards,itisstill“earlydays.”ButIamnotheretodiscussthepromiseoftechnology–therearemanyinattendanceandspeakingheretodaythatcandoamuchbetterjobofthat.Iwouldliketofocusontheapplicationofthefederalsecuritieslawstodigitalassettransactions–thatishowtokensandcoinsarebeingissued,distributedandsold.Whileperhapsabitdryerthanthepromiseoftheblockchain,thistopiciscriticaltothebroaderacceptanceanduseofthesenovelinstruments.IwillbeginbydescribingwhatIoftensee.Promoters,inordertoraisemoneytodevelopnetworksonwhichdigitalassetswilloperate,oftensellthetokensorcoinsratherthansellshares,issuenotesorobtainbankfinancing.But,inmanycases,theeconomicsubstanceisthesameasaconventionalsecuritiesoffering.Fundsareraisedwiththeexpectationthatthepromoterswillbuildtheirsystemandinvestorscanearnareturnontheinstrument–usuallybysellingtheirtokensinthesecondarymarketoncethepromoterscreatesomethingofvaluewiththeproceedsandthevalueofthedigitalenterpriseincreases.Whenweseethatkindofeconomictransaction,itiseasytoapplytheSupremeCourt’s“investmentcontract”testfirstannouncedinSECv.Howey.Thattestrequiresaninvestmentofmoneyinacommonenterprisewithanexpectationofprofitderivedfromtheeffortsofothers.AnditisimportanttoreflectonthefactsofHowey.Ahoteloperatorsoldinterestsinacitrusgrovetoitsguestsandclaimeditwassellingrealestate,notsecurities.Whilethetransactionwasrecordedasarealestatesale,italsoincludedaservicecontracttocultivateandharvesttheoranges.Thepurchaserscouldhavearrangedtoservicethegrovethemselvesbut,infact,mostwerepassive,relyingontheeffortsofHowey-in-the-HillsService,Inc.forareturn.Inarticulatingthetestforaninvestmentcontract,theSupremeCourtstressed:“Formdisregardedforsubstanceandtheemphasisplaceduponeconomicreality.”Sothepurportedrealestatepurchasewasfoundtobeaninvestmentcontract–aninvestmentinorangegroveswasinthesecircumstancesaninvestmentinasecurity.JustasintheHoweycase,tokensandcoinsareoftentoutedasassetsthathaveauseintheirownright,coupledwithapromisethattheassetswillbecultivatedinawaythatwillcausethemtogrowinvalue,tobesoldlaterataprofit.And,asinHowey–whereinterestsinthegrovesweresoldtohotelguests,notfarmers–tokensandcoinstypicallyaresoldtoawideaudienceratherthantopersonswhoarelikelytousethemonthenetwork.IntheICOsIhaveseen,overwhelmingly,promoterstouttheirabilitytocreateaninnovativeapplicationofblockchaintechnology.LikeinHowey,theinvestorsarepassive.Marketingeffortsarerarelynarrowlytargetedtotokenusers.Andtypicallyattheoutset,thebusinessmodelandveryviabilityoftheapplicationisstilluncertain.Thepurchaserusuallyhasnochoicebuttorelyontheeffortsofthepromotertobuildthenetworkandmaketheenterpriseasuccess.Atthatstage,thepurchaseofatokenlooksalotlikeabetonthesuccessoftheenterpriseandnotthepurchaseofsomethingusedtoexchangeforgoodsorservicesonthenetwork.Asanaside,youmightask,giventhatthesetokensalesoftenlooklikesecuritiesofferings,whyarethepromoterschoosingtopackagetheinvestmentasacoinortokenoffering?Thisisanespeciallygoodquestionifthenetworkonwhichthetokenorcoinwillfunctionisnotyetoperational.Ithinktherecanbeanumberofreasons.Forawhile,somebelievedsuchlabelingmight,byitself,removethetransactionfromthesecuritieslaws.Ithinkpeoplenowrealizelabelinganinvestmentopportunityasacoinortokendoesnotachievethatresult.Second,thislabelingmighthavebeenusedtobringsomemarketing“sizzle”totheenterprise.Thatmightstillworktosomeextent,butthetrackrecordofICOsisstillbeingsortedoutandsomeofthatsizzlemaynowbemoreofapotentialwarningflareforinvestors.Somemaybeattractedtoablockchain-mediatedcrowdfundingprocess.Digitalassetscanrepresentanefficientwaytoreachaglobalaudiencewhereinitialpurchasershaveastakeinthesuccessofthenetworkandbecomepartofanetworkwheretheirparticipationaddsvaluebeyondtheirinvestmentcontributions.Thedigitalassetsarethenexchanged–forsome,tohelpfindthemarketpriceforthenewapplication;forothers,tospeculateontheventure.AsIwilldiscuss,whetheratransactioninacoinortokenonthesecondarymarketamountstoanofferorsaleofasecurityrequiresacarefulandfact-sensitivelegalanalysis.Ibelievesomeindustryparticipantsarebeginningtorealizethat,insomecircumstances,itmightbeeasiertostartablockchain-basedenterpriseinamoreconventionalway.Inotherwords,conducttheinitialfundingthrougharegisteredorexemptequityordebtofferingand,oncethenetworkisupandrunning,distributeorofferblockchain-basedtokensorcoinstoparticipantswhoneedthefunctionalitythenetworkandthedigitalassetsoffer.Thisallowsthetokensorcoinstobestructuredandofferedinawaywhereitisevidentthatpurchasersarenotmakinganinvestmentinthedevelopmentoftheenterprise.ReturningtotheICOsIamseeing,strictlyspeaking,thetoken–orcoinorwhateverthedigitalinformationpacketiscalled–allbyitselfisnotasecurity,justastheorangegrovesinHoweywerenot.Centraltodeterminingwhetherasecurityisbeingsoldishowitisbeingsoldandthereasonableexpectationsofpurchasers.Whensomeonebuysahousingunittolivein,itisprobablynotasecurity.Butundercertaincircumstances,thesameassetcanbeofferedandsoldinawaythatcausesinvestorstohaveareasonableexpectationofprofitsbasedontheeffortsofothers.Forexample,ifthehousingunitisofferedwithamanagementcontractorotherservices,itcanbeasecurity.Similarly,whenaCD,exemptfrombeingtreatedasasecurityunderSection3oftheSecuritiesAct,issoldasapartofaprogramorganizedbyabrokerwhooffersretailinvestorspromisesofliquidityandthepotentialtoprofitfromchangesininterestrates,theGaryPlasticcaseteachesusthattheinstrumentcanbepartofaninvestmentcontractthatisasecurity.Thesamereasoningappliestodigitalassets.Thedigitalassetitselfissimplycode.Butthewayitissold–aspartofaninvestment;tonon-users;bypromoterstodeveloptheenterprise–canbe,and,inthatcontext,mostoftenis,asecurity–becauseitevidencesaninvestmentcontract.Andregulatingthesetransactionsassecuritiestransactionsmakessense.TheimpetusoftheSecuritiesActistoremovetheinformationasymmetrybetweenpromotersandinvestors.Inapublicdistribution,theSecuritiesActprescribestheinformationinvestorsneedtomakeaninformedinvestmentdecision,andthepromoterisliableformaterialmisstatementsintheofferingmaterials.Theseareimportantsafeguards,andtheyareappropriateformostICOs.ThedisclosuresrequiredunderthefederalsecuritieslawsnicelycomplementtheHoweyinvestmentcontractelementabouttheeffortsofothers.Asaninvestor,thesuccessoftheenterprise–andtheabilitytorealizeaprofitontheinvestment–turnsontheeffortsofthethirdparty.Solearningmaterialinformationaboutthethirdparty–itsbackground,financing,plans,financialstakeandsoforth–isaprerequisitetomakinganinformedinvestmentdecision.Withoutaregulatoryframeworkthatpromotesdisclosureofwhatthethirdpartyaloneknowsofthesetopicsandtherisksassociatedwiththeventure,investorswillbeuninformedandareatrisk.Butthisalsopointsthewaytowhenadigitalassettransactionmaynolongerrepresentasecurityoffering.Ifthenetworkonwhichthetokenorcoinistofunctionissufficientlydecentralized–wherepurchaserswouldnolongerreasonablyexpectapersonorgrouptocarryoutessentialmanagerialorentrepreneurialefforts–theassetsmaynotrepresentaninvestmentcontract.Moreover,whentheeffortsofthethirdpartyarenolongerakeyfactorfordeterminingtheenterprise’ssuccess,materialinformationasymmetriesrecede.Asanetworkbecomestrulydecentralized,theabilitytoidentifyanissuerorpromotertomaketherequisitedisclosuresbecomesdifficult,andlessmeaningful.Andso,whenIlookatBitcointoday,Idonotseeacentralthirdpartywhoseeffortsareakeydeterminingfactorintheenterprise.ThenetworkonwhichBitcoinfunctionsisoperationalandappearstohavebeendecentralizedforsometime,perhapsfrominception.ApplyingthedisclosureregimeofthefederalsecuritieslawstotheofferandresaleofBitcoinwouldseemtoaddlittlevalue.AndputtingasidethefundraisingthataccompaniedthecreationofEther,basedonmyunderstandingofthepresentstateofEther,theEthereumnetworkanditsdecentralizedstructure,currentoffersandsalesofEtherarenotsecuritiestransactions.And,aswithBitcoin,applyingthedisclosureregimeofthefederalsecuritieslawstocurrenttransactionsinEtherwouldseemtoaddlittlevalue.Overtime,theremaybeothersufficientlydecentralizednetworksandsystemswhereregulatingthetokensorcoinsthatfunctiononthemassecuritiesmaynotberequired.Andofcoursetherewillcontinuetobesystemsthatrelyoncentralactorswhoseeffortsareakeytothesuccessoftheenterprise.Inthosecases,applicationofthesecuritieslawsprotectstheinvestorswhopurchasethetokensorcoins.Iwouldliketoemphasizethattheanalysisofwhethersomethingisasecurityisnotstaticanddoesnotstrictlyinheretotheinstrument.Evendigitalassetswithutilitythatfunctionsolelyasameansofexchangeinadecentralizednetworkcouldbepackagedandsoldasaninvestmentstrategythatcanbeasecurity.IfapromoterweretoplaceBitcoininafundortrustandsellinterests,itwouldcreateanewsecurity.Similarly,investmentcontractscanbemadeoutofvirtuallyanyasset(includingvirtualassets),providedtheinvestorisreasonablyexpectingprofitsfromthepromoter’sefforts.Letmeemphasizeanearlierpoint:simplylabelingadigitalasseta“utilitytoken”doesnotturntheassetintosomethingthatisnotasecurity.IrecognizethattheSupremeCourthasacknowledgedthatifsomeoneispurchasinganassetforconsumptiononly,itislikelynotasecurity.But,theeconomicsubstanceofthetransactionalwaysdeterminesthelegalanalysis,notthelabels.TheorangesinHoweyhadutility.Orinmyfavoriteexample,theCommissionwarnedinthelate1960saboutinvestmentcontractssoldintheformofwhiskywarehousereceipts.PromoterssoldthereceiptstoU.S.investorstofinancetheagingandblendingprocessesofScotchwhisky.Thewhiskywasreal–and,forsome,hadexquisiteutility.ButHoweywasnotsellingorangesandthewarehousereceiptspromoterswerenotsellingwhiskyforconsumption.Theyweresellinginvestments,andthepurchaserswereexpectingareturnfromthepromoters’efforts.Promotersandothermarketparticipantsneedtounderstandwhethertransactionsinaparticulardigitalassetinvolvethesaleofasecurity.Wearehappytohelppromotersandtheircounselworkthroughtheseissues.Westandpreparedtoprovidemoreformalinterpretiveorno-actionguidanceaboutthepropercharacterizationofadigitalassetinaproposeduse.Inaddition,werecognizethattherearenumerousimplicationsunderthefederalsecuritieslawsofaparticularassetbeingconsideredasecurity.Forexample,ourDivisionsofTradingandMarketsandInvestmentManagementarefocusedonsuchissuesasbroker-dealer,exchangeandfundregistration,aswellasmattersofmarketmanipulation,custodyandvaluation.Weunderstandthatmarketparticipantsareworkingtomaketheirservicescompliantwiththeexistingregulatoryframework,andwearehappytocontinueourengagementinthisprocess.Whataresomeofthefactorstoconsiderinassessingwhetheradigitalassetisofferedasaninvestmentcontractandisthusasecurity?Primarily,considerwhetherathirdparty–beitaperson,entityorcoordinatedgroupofactors–drivestheexpectationofareturn.Thatquestionwillalwaysdependontheparticularfactsandcircumstances,andthislistisillustrative,notexhaustive:Isthereapersonorgroupthathassponsoredorpromotedthecreationandsaleofthedigitalasset,theeffortsofwhomplayasignificantroleinthedevelopmentandmaintenanceoftheassetanditspotentialincreaseinvalue?Hasthispersonorgroupretainedastakeorotherinterestinthedigitalassetsuchthatitwouldbemotivatedtoexpendeffortstocauseanincreaseinvalueinthedigitalasset?Wouldpurchasersreasonablybelievesucheffortswillbeundertakenandmayresultinareturnontheirinvestmentinthedigitalasset?Hasthepromoterraisedanamountoffundsinexcessofwhatmaybeneededtoestablishafunctionalnetwork,and,ifso,hasitindicatedhowthosefundsmaybeusedtosupportthevalueofthetokensortoincreasethevalueoftheenterprise?Doesthepromotercontinuetoexpendfundsfromproceedsoroperationstoenhancethefunctionalityand/orvalueofthesystemwithinwhichthetokensoperate?Arepurchasers“investing,”thatisseekingareturn?Inthatregard,istheinstrumentmarketedandsoldtothegeneralpublicinsteadoftopotentialusersofthenetworkforapricethatreasonablycorrelateswiththemarketvalueofthegoodorserviceinthenetwork?DoesapplicationoftheSecuritiesActprotectionsmakesense?Isthereapersonorentityothersarerelyingonthatplaysakeyroleintheprofit-makingoftheenterprisesuchthatdisclosureoftheiractivitiesandplanswouldbeimportanttoinvestors?Doinformationalasymmetriesexistbetweenthepromotersandpotentialpurchasers/investorsinthedigitalasset?Dopersonsorentitiesotherthanthepromoterexercisegovernancerightsormeaningfulinfluence?Whilethesefactorsareimportantinanalyzingtheroleofanythirdparty,therearecontractualortechnicalwaystostructuredigitalassetssotheyfunctionmorelikeaconsumeritemandlesslikeasecurity.Again,wewouldlooktotheeconomicsubstanceofthetransaction,butpromotersandtheircounselsshouldconsiderthese,andother,possiblefeatures.ThislistisnotintendedtobeexhaustiveandbynomeansdoIbelieveeachandeveryoneofthesefactorsneedstobepresenttoestablishacasethatatokenisnotbeingofferedasasecurity.Thislistismeanttopromptthinkingbypromotersandtheircounsel,andstartthedialoguewiththestaff–itisnotmeanttobealistofallnecessaryfactorsinalegalanalysis.Istokencreationcommensuratewithmeetingtheneedsofusersor,rather,withfeedingspeculation?Areindependentactorssettingthepriceoristhepromotersupportingthesecondarymarketfortheassetorotherwiseinfluencingtrading?Isitclearthattheprimarymotivationforpurchasingthedigitalassetisforpersonaluseorconsumption,ascomparedtoinvestment?Havepurchasersmaderepresentationsastotheirconsumptive,asopposedtotheirinvestment,intent?Arethetokensavailableinincrementsthatcorrelatewithaconsumptiveversusinvestmentintent?Arethetokensdistributedinwaystomeetusers’needs?Forexample,canthetokensbeheldortransferredonlyinamountsthatcorrespondtoapurchaser’sexpecteduse?Aretherebuilt-inincentivesthatcompelusingthetokenspromptlyonthenetwork,suchashavingthetokensdegradeinvalueovertime,orcanthetokensbeheldforextendedperiodsforinvestment?Istheassetmarketedanddistributedtopotentialusersorthegeneralpublic?Aretheassetsdispersedacrossadiverseuserbaseorconcentratedinthehandsofafewthatcanexertinfluenceovertheapplication?Istheapplicationfullyfunctioningorinearlystagesofdevelopment?TheseareexcitinglegaltimesandIampleasedtobepartofaprocessthatcanhelppromotersofthisnewtechnologyandtheircounselnavigateandcomplywiththefederalsecuritieslaws.TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissiondisclaimsresponsibilityforanyprivatepublicationorstatementofanySECemployeeorCommissioner.Thisspeechexpressestheauthor’sviewsanddoesnotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheCommission,theCommissionersorothermembersofthestaff.Section2(a)(1)oftheSecuritiesActof1933(SecuritiesAct)andSection3(a)(10)oftheSecuritiesExchangeActof1934(ExchangeAct)define“security.”Thesedefinitionscontain“slightlydifferentformulations”oftheterm“security,”buttheU.S.SupremeCourthas“treatedasessentiallyidenticalinmeaning.”SECv.Edwards,540U.S.389,393(2004).Iamusingtheterm“promoters”inabroad,genericsense.Theimportantfactorinthelegalanalysisisthatthereisapersonorcoordinatedgroup(including“anyunincorporatedorganization”see5U.S.C.§77n(a)(4))thatisworkingactivelytodeveloporguidethedevelopmentoftheinfrastructureofthenetwork.Thispersonorgroupcouldbefounders,sponsors,developersor“promoters”inthetraditionalsense.Thepresenceofpromotersinthiscontextisimportanttodistinguishfromthecircumstancewheremultiple,independentactorsworkonthenetworkbutnoindividualactor’sorcoordinatedgroupofactors’effortsareessentialeffortsthataffectthefailureorsuccessoftheenterprise.SECv.W.J.HoweyCo.,328U.S.293(1946).Dependingonthefeaturesofanygiveninstrumentandthesurroundingfacts,itmayalsoneedtobeevaluatedasapossiblesecurityunderthegeneraldefinitionofsecurity–seefootnote2–andthecaselawinterpretingit.Id.at298.UnitedHousingFound.,Inc.v.Forman,421U.S.837(1975).GuidelinesastotheApplicabilityoftheFederalSecuritiesLawstoOffersandSalesofCondominiumsorUnitsinaRealEstateDevelopment,SECRel.No.33-5347(Jan.4,1973).GaryPlasticPackagingCorp.v.MerrillLynch,Pierce,Fenner&Smith,Inc.,756F.2d230(2dCir.1985).Secondarytradingindigitalassetsbyregulatedentitiesmayotherwiseimplicatethefederalsecuritieslaws,aswellastheCommodityExchangeAct.Inaddition,asSECChairmanJayClaytonhasstated,regulatedfinancialentitiesthatallowforpaymentincryptocurrencies,allowcustomerstopurchasecryptocurrenciesonmarginorotherwiseusecryptocurrenciestofacilitatesecuritiestransactionsshouldexercisecaution,includingensuringthattheircryptocurrencyactivitiesarenotunderminingtheiranti-moneylaunderingandknow-your-customerobligations.StatementonCryptocurrenciesandInitialCoinOfferings(Dec.11,2017).Inaddition,otherlawsandregulations,suchasIRSregulationsandstatemoneyservicinglaws,maybeimplicated.TheSupremeCourt’sinvestmentcontracttest“embodiesaflexibleratherthanastaticprinciple,onethatiscapableofadaptationtomeetthecountlessandvariableschemesdevisedbythosewhoseektheuseofthemoneyofothersonthepromiseofprofits.”Howey,328U.S.at299.“henamegiventoaninstrumentisnotdispositive.”Forman,421U.S.at850.Forman,421U.S.at853.Seefootnotes10and11.SECRel.No.33-5018(Nov.4,1969);InvestmentinInterestsinWhisky,SECRel.No.33-5451(Jan7,1974).Forexample,somehaveraisedquestionsabouttheofferingstructurecommonlyreferredtoasaSimpleAgreementforFutureTokens,or“SAFT.”Becausethelegalanalysismustfollowtheeconomicrealitiesoftheparticularfactsofanoffering,itmaynotbefruitfultodebateahypotheticalstructureintheabstractandnothingintheseremarksismeanttoopineonthelegalityorappropriatenessofaSAFT.Fromthediscussioninthisspeech,however,itisclearIbelieveatokenonceofferedinasecurityofferingcan,dependingonthecircumstances,laterbeofferedinanon-securitiestransaction.Iexpectthatsome,perhapsmany,maynot.IencourageanyonethathasquestionsonaparticularSAFTstructuretoconsultwithknowledgeablesecuritiescounselorthestaff.
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